Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And. by Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas
Repeated communication through the
mechanism and
Olivier Gossner¤ Nicolas Vieilley
March 24, 2003
Abstract
We consider the \and" communication device that receives inputs
from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages
are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can
securely be implemented using this device, even when in¯nitely many
stages of communication are allowed.
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Our goal in this paper is to analyze the intrinsic correlation opportunities of-
fered by a given communication device (Forges [3]). It thus relates closely to
the literature on preplay communication, and more precisely to the literature
on mediated talk, initiated by Lehrer [8]. In this strand of literature, a game
is given, and one wishes to implement correlated equilibrium distributions
(c.e.d. thereinafter) of the game as the outcome of communication equilib-
ria, using communication devices of a simple form. In Lehrer and Sorin [9],
it is shown that any c.e.d. (with rational entries) coincides with the distribu-
tion induced by some communication equilibrium, where the communication
device sends public outputs that depend deterministically on the inputs.
It is natural to allow for repeated preplay communication; namely, to
consider situations in which preplay communication proceeds in stages. At
each stage, the players send inputs to the device, that sends back outputs.
In that case, a stronger result is obtained. Given a game, there exists a
communication device with public and deterministic output, that has the
following property: every c.e.d. can be approximated by the outcome of an
equilibrium of the game extended by ¯nitely many stages of preplay commu-
nication. Thus, the same communication device is used for every c.e.d.; only
the length of the preplay communication depends on the particular c.e.d.
The previous devices are game-dependent1. We wish here to avoid this
dependency, and to investigate the existence of universal protocols of com-
munication. Given a communication device, we wish to characterize the set
of distributions ¹ that can be implemented with it, in the sense that: as soon
as ¹ is a c.e.d. of a game G, ¹ is the outcome of an equilibrium of the game
G, extended with in¯nitely many stages of preplay communication. More-
over, we shall require that the strategies during the communication phase
(the communication protocol) does not depend on G.
More precisely, the question we ask here is essentially the following. Let
D1;D2 be ¯nite (action) sets for two players and let a communication device
be given. We allow in¯nitely many stages of communication. A protocol
consists in the speci¯cation of a pro¯le of communication strategies, and
of rules used to choose an action, as a function of the sequence of signals
received during preplay communication. A protocol induces a distribution ¹
1In the ¯rst quoted result of Lehrer-Sorin, the device depends only on ¹, not on the
game on which ¹ is a c.e.d.
2over the product set D = D1 £ D2. A protocol securely implements ¹ if, for
every game G with action sets D1 and D2, the protocol is a Nash equilibrium
of the extended game, as soon as ¹ is a correlated equilibrium distribution of
G. Gossner [6] establishes a convenient characterization of secure protocols.
In words, a protocol securely implements ¹ if
(i) no player can manipulate the distribution of decisions
(ii) at the end of the communication phase, player i's belief on the other
player's decision coincides with ¹(¢jdi), whatever be the sequence of messages
received by player i : the decision player i is about to take contains all the
information he has about the decision of the other player.
This question was partly addressed in B¶ ar¶ any [1], who assumes that at
least four players communicate using \phone lines" , and in addition that
each player has available a STOP button, that reveals to all players all past
communication. Therefore, his study does not fall into our framework. Under
these assumptions, B¶ ar¶ any shows that any distribution with rational coe±-
cients can be securely implemented.
We answer our question in the case of a speci¯c communication device,
which we call the and-mechanism. The and-operator in logic is de¯ned over
f0;1g £ f0;1g as and(x;y) = xy. By analogy, we de¯ne the and-mechanism
as a communication mechanism which receive messages x;y from two play-
ers, chosen in f0;1g, and sends them back the value of and(x;y). We assume
in addition that each player remembers which message he sent or, equiva-
lently, that the signals to 1 and 2 are respectively the pairs (x;and(x;y)) and




The crucial feature of this mechanism is that when player 1 sends x = 0 to
the mechanism, the signal he gets gives him no information about the value
of y (and(0;y) = 0) whereas when he sends x = 1, he is able to deduce the
value of y from his signal (and(1;y) = y).
The main rationale for considering this device is that it is the simplest de-
vice which, when repeated, allows for a complex intertwining of the informa-
tion structures of the two players. Indeed, the two information structures H1
n
and H2
n corresponding to the ¯rst n stages of communication are so di®erent
that knowledge operators of di®erent depth di®er. It is therefore reasonable
3to hope that the techniques developed here may be of use in dealing with
more general devices.
Our result is essentially negative: we prove that only babbling is secure.
If decisions are not independent of the outcome of the communication phase,
the procedure can be manipulated by one player. Our result can be rephrased
as saying that any non-trivial attempt to use the intertwining of information
structures to generate correlation after in¯nitely many stages of preplay com-
munication can be manipulated by at least one player. Parts of the proofs
below may be found in [5], [11].
Our result thus stands in sharp contrast with those of Lehrer [7]. Lehrer
studied the and-mechanism in the context of repeated games with imperfect
monitoring. In this context, it is natural to study the case where the whole
procedure (preplay communication and decision stage) is in¯nitely repeated
over time. Lehrer proves that any distribution with rational coe±cients can
be obtained. This involves a statistical monitoring of the behavior of each
player.
This question is also related to issues in computer science. For instance,
in the design of fault-tolerant distributed systems, protocols (i.e., commu-
nication strategies) are sought for that enable interconnected processors to
perform a given task, even if one (or more) is to fail. More than two pro-
cessors are assumed, and the communication mechanism consists of secure
communication lines between each two processors, which allow them to ex-
changes messages without being eavesdropped. We refer to Linial [10] for
references and an extensive discussion of the links between game theory and
computer science.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains the model and the
statement of the result. Sections 2 and 3 contain the proof. Section 2 deals
with the case where ¯nitely many stages of communication are allowed. Sec-
tion 3 deals with the general case, and is independent of Section 2. Although
the result of Section 2 is included in Section 3, its proof is both much more
simple and intuitive. We thus ¯nd it worthy to include it.
2 Concepts and results
We take up the study of the repeated and-mechanism described in the in-
troduction. For emphasis, we label the possible messages of player i 2 f1;2g
as Ni (for non-informative) and Ii (for informative). We set Mi = fNi;Iig.
4For simplicity, we label a;b;c;¤ the di®erent input combinations, as speci¯ed




The signal function l1 of player 1 is best described by introducing P1 =
ffa;cg;fbg;f¤gg. It is the partition of the set of message pairs induced by the
signaling function of player 1: when the combination of messages sent to the
mechanism is m, player 1 is told which atom of P1 contains m. For simplicity,
we sometimes write P1 = fN1;I1;¤g. The information partition P2 of player
2 is de¯ned symmetrically. For instance, l1(N1;I2) = fa;cg = N1, while
l2(N1;I2) = fcg.
Repeated communication unfolds as follows: at every stage n 2 I N, play-
ers send simultaneously messages m1
n;m2




The set of plays is H1 = MI N = fa;b;c;¤gI N. We denote by Hi
n the
information available to player i in stage n, prior to sending a message: it
is the algebra over H1 generated by cylinder sets of the form hi
n £ H1,
where hi
n 2 (Pi)n¡1 is a sequence of n ¡ 1 elements of fNi;Ii;¤g. We also
denote by Hn the algebra generated by histories up to stage n, namely by




n;n ¸ 1) and H1 = ¾(Hn;n ¸ 1) the ¾-algebras over H1 induced
by these algebras. We shall sometimes use the natural identi¯cation of Hn
with the ¯nite set Hn = fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1.
The set Si
n of pure (resp. §i
n of mixed) strategies of communication at
stage n is the set of all maps from (H1;Hi
n) to Mi (resp. ¢(Mi)): such a
map speci¯es which message to send in stage n, as a function of the signals
received so far. A pure (resp. behavioral) strategy of communication of






the set of pure strategies of player i is Si = £n¸1Si
n, endowed with the
product topology of the discrete ones on each factor. Si is then compact and
metrizable. We denote by Si the Borel ¾-algebra on Si. A mixed strategy of
player i is a probability distribution over (Si;Si). Since perfect recall holds,
any mixed strategy is equivalent to a behavioral strategy.
At the end of the communication phase, player i takes a decision from
a ¯nite set Di. A decision rule Á
i speci¯es which decision to choose as
a function of the signals; it is a mapping from (Hi
1;Hi
1) to ¢(Di). A
5protocol consists of a pair of strategies (¾1;¾2) together with a pair of
decision rules Á = (Á
1;Á
2). Set D = D1 £ D2. Given a protocol (¾;Á), P¾;Á
stands for the probability distribution induced by ¾ and Á on (H1£D;H1­
2D) and ¹¾;Á and ¹i
¾;Á are the marginals of P¾;Á on D and Di respectively.
Similarly, P¾ is the distribution induced by ¾ on (H1;H1). We call ¹¾;Á the
information structure generated by the protocol (¾;Á).
It is clear how the above specializes when only ¯nitely many stages of





We use extensively various coordinate mappings, which we represent in
bold type: mi
n, si
n are respectively the message sent and signal received by
player i in stage n, hi
n is the sequence of signals by i up to stage n (such a
sequence is usually identi¯ed to an atom of Hi
n), h1 is the history up to the
decision stage, and di is the decision of player i. Bold type symbols hence
represent random variables.
For simplicity, we sometimes write hi












then the probability of sending the message mi. The support of a measure º
is denoted by supp º:
We recall from Gossner [6] the de¯nition of a secure protocol.






1 is less informative on d2 under P(¿1;¾2);Á than d1 under P¾;Á,
and symmetric properties hold for player 2.
R.1 means that player 1 can not in°uence the distribution of d2 by deviating
from ¾1.
The notion of less informative in R.2 refers to Blackwell's [2] notion of
comparison of experiments. The comparison in R.2 is meaningful since the
distributions of d2 under P¾;Á and P(¿1;¾2);Á are the same. R.2 implies that
player one cannot get more information on d2 by changing ¾1, and that d1







6This de¯nition is motivated by the following property (Gossner [6]). Given
a strategic form game G, de¯ne the two games ¡1(G) and ¡2(G) as follows:
² in ¡1(G), d 2 D is drawn according to ¹, player i is informed of the
coordinate di, then plays in G;
² in ¡2(G), players communicate through the mechanism, then play in
G:
A protocol is secure if and only if for every G and every Nash equilib-
rium f of ¡1(G), the following is a Nash equilibrium of ¡2(G): communicate
according to ¾, take decisions following Á, then play in G according to f.
We call ¹ 2 ¢(D) a secure distribution, or secure information structure,
if ¹ = ¹¾;Á for some secure protocol (¾;Á).
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1 The set of secure distributions is ¢(D1) £ ¢(D2).
Remark 1: let ¹ = ¹1 ­ ¹2 2 ¢(D1) £ ¢(D2). It is straightforward to
generate ¹ as the result of babbling. De¯ne ¾ = (¾1;¾2) arbitrarily (players
babble), and let player i ignore the communication and choose di according
to ¹i: Á
i is the constant map ¹i. Such (¾;Á) is clearly secure. Therefore,
what our result really entails is that every non-trivial protocol based upon
the and-mechanism can be manipulated. No correlation can be secured, even
when in¯nitely many stages of preplay communication are allowed.
3 Finitely many stages
3.1 Reduction to minimal information structures
An information structure ¹ 2 ¢(D) is called minimal when:
² For any d1
0;d1
1 2 supp ¹1, the conditional probabilities ¹(¢jd1
0) and
¹(¢jd1
1) on D2 di®er.
² A symmetric condition holds for player 2.
7This amounts to assuming that the statistic di must be minimal for
player i.
For instance, the only minimal information structures in ¢(D1)£¢(D2)
are the unit masses.
Remark 2: By Proposition 9.3 in [6], it is enough to prove that minimal
secure information structures are unit masses. In the following, we focus on
minimal information structures.
Remark 3: Let (¾;Á) be a secure protocol which generates ¹. Then, P¾;Á-
a.s., for every di 2 supp Á
i(hi
1), P¾;Á(d3¡i = ¢jdi) = P¾;Á(d3¡i = ¢jhi
1).
Therefore, since ¹ is minimal, Á
i(hi
1) is a Dirac mass, P¾;Á-a.s. In other
words, Á
i is "pure" on the support of P¾.
3.2 Proof for ¯nitely many stages
We assume here that N stages of communication are allowed.
Let (¾;Á) be a secure protocol, and ¹ = ¹¾;Á. We identify ¹ to a D1£D2-
matrix, whose (d1;d2)-entry is ¹(d1;d2). As noted in the previous section, we
may assume that, P¾-a.s., Á
i(hi
1) puts probability one on some decision. It
is crucial to note that we cannot assume this to hold outside of the support
of P¾.
The proof is divided in two steps. First, we introduce a most informative
deviation of player i, and argue that up to some permutation of lines and
columns, ¹ is diagonal: at the end of the communication phase, each player
knows P¾;Á-a.s. the decision of the other. Second, we introduce a least
informative deviation of player i, and prove that ¹ is concentrated on one
decision pair.
Step 1: a most informative strategy We shall de¯ne a strategy of
player 1 that enables him to know at the end of the communication phase
which decision player 2 is about to take. Clearly, the way to get the most
information is to use the strategy ~ ¾1 de¯ned as: play I1 in every stage,
irrespective of past signals. This falls short of proving anything since the
supports of P(~ ¾1;¾2);Á and P¾;Á may be disjoint: hence, knowing which signals
player 2 did receive may not enable player 1 to deduce which decision player 2
is about to take (since the decision rule might be random outside the support
of P¾;Á).
8Hence we amend the above de¯nition of ~ ¾1 as: play I1 whenever player
2 ¯nds it plausible that player 1 does play I1, i.e., when, conditional upon
player 2's past signals, there is a positive P¾;Á-probability that player 1 sends
the message I1. Of course, this is not well-de¯ned since the message sent by
player 1 is then a function of the information held by player 2. Therefore,
our ¯rst task is to show that this construction is essentially meaningful: we
show inductively that if player 1 abides by this strategy up to stage n, player
1 will know at stage n the belief held by player 2 on player 1's message at
stage n.
De¯nition 2 Let P be a probability distribution, X be a random variable
de¯ned over (H1;H1), and n 2 I N. We say that player 1 knows X under
P at stage n if there exists an H1
n-measurable version of X under P.
Thus, player 1 knows X under P if there exists a H1
n-measurable variable
Y such that P(X = Y ) = 1.
It is convenient to introduce the set C1
n(h2
n) of sequences of signals (to













where the intersection h1
n \ h2









n) is de¯ned similarly.
Let p2
n = P¾;Á[¢jH2




1 is a constant (H2
1 is trivial), hence known to player 1 at stage 1.
We construct ¾1
+ inductively. Assume that ¾1
+;m has been de¯ned for
m < n, and that player 1 knows p2
n at stage n under P¾1
+;¾2 (this depends
only upon the de¯nition of (¾1
+;¾2) in the ¯rst n ¡ 1 stages). Denote by ~ p2
n
an H1





n) = I1 if ~ p2
n(h1
n)fm1
n = I1g > 0
¾1
+;n(h1
n) = N1 otherwise
In the ¯rst case, player 1 knows that player 2 asserts a strictly positive
probability on I1 being played in stage n. In the second case, player 1 knows
that player 2 does not expect I1 to be played.
Lemma 1 Player 1 knows p2
n+1 at stage n + 1 under P¾1
+;¾2
9Proof: consider any sequence of signals h1
n+1 2 H1
n+1 that belongs to the
support of P¾1
+;¾2. We need to prove that p2








n contains the signals to player





n+1) \ supp P¾1
+;¾2. We
distinguish three cases.
In the ¯rst case we assume that player 1 knows that player 2 expects N1
to be played:
Case 1: s1









and the belief p2
n+1(h2














n] if ~ s1
n = N1
0 otherwise
In words, after any history e h1
n consistent with h2
n, player 1 is supposed to
play N1, hence the probability assigned by player 2 to the sequence (e h1
n;N1)
coincides with the probability assigned to e h1
n.
In the last two cases, m1
n = I1, hence player 1 gets to know s2
n. Since he
knew the belief p2
n of player 2, he can compute the belief held in stage n+1.
Case 2: s1
n = I1.
In that case, s2
















n] £ ¾1(~ h1





n] £ ¾1(~ h1
n)[N1] for ~ s1
n = N1




In that case, s2























n)[I1] for ~ s1
n = ¤
0 otherwise
In each case, the belief of player 2 in stage n + 1 is known to player 1.
Therefore, under (¾1
+;¾2;Á), player 1 knows at stage N the belief held by
player 2 over H1
N, hence the belief over d1. Using the minimality assumption,
10this implies that, P¾1
+;¾2;Á-a.s., player 2 knows d2 at stage N. By secureness,
h1
N is less informative on d2 under P¾1
+;¾2;Á than d1 on d2 under P¾;Á. Thus,
for every d1 2 supp ¹1, d2 2 D2, ¹(d2jd1) is either equal to 0 or 1. Using
once again the minimality assumption, ¹ is a diagonal matrix (up to some
permutation of lines and columns and after deletion of lines and columns
containing only 0's). This ends the proof of Lemma 1. |
Step 2: a least informative strategy Clearly, the strategy of player
1 that provides him with the least information about signals received by
player 2 is to send repeatedly the message N1. As above, this has to be
amended, since it might be the case that player 2 knows at some stage that
player 1 should play I1 according to ¾1. We de¯ne ¾1
¡ as: play N1 when-
ever N1 is played with positive probability according to ¾1, ¾1
¡(h1
n) = N1 if
¾1(h1
n)[N1] > 0, and ¾1
¡(h1
n) = I1 otherwise. It is clear that P¾1
¡;¾2 ¿ P¾
(absolutely continuous). We set S =supp P¾1
¡;¾2. We prove in Lemma 2 that
d1 is constant on S. Since S µsupp P¾ and ¹ is diagonal, d2 is also constant
on S. Since the distributions of d2 under P¾1
¡;¾2 and P¾ are the same, this
implies that ¹ is concentrated on a single decision pair d 2 D. This concludes
the proof of the theorem in the ¯nitely repeated case.
We ¯rst brie°y give the intuition behind Lemma 2. If the decision of
player 1 were to depend upon the signals received in the stages in which he
plays I1, there would be a sequence h1
n such that (h1
n;I1) and (h1
n;¤) belong
to S, and the distributions of d1 conditional on these sequences di®er. One
then can de¯ne a strategy of player 2 which enables him to know at stage
n whether player 1 did receive h1
n or not. By playing either N2 or I2 in
that case, and properly mimicking ¾2 afterwards, player 2 would be able
to in°uence the distribution of d1. This would contradict the secureness of
(¾;Á).
Lemma 2 d1 is constant on S.
Proof: we prove inductively that the conditional distribution P¾[d1 = ¢jH1
n]
is constant, P¾1
¡;¾2-a.s. In words, under (¾1
¡;¾2); the belief over d1 held by
player 1 at stage n is independent of the particular sequence of signals that
is obtained at stage n. We emphasize that the belief is computed under the
original pro¯le ¾.
11There is nothing to prove for n = 1 since H1
1 is trivial; we assume this is























n) > 0. If there is only one
sequence h1
n+1 which has positive probability under (¾1;¾2) given h1
n, then






n] 2]0;1[. In that case h1
n+1 may either be (h1
n;I1) or
(h1

















We de¯ne a strategy ¾2
+ that enables player 2 to assess whether or not player
1 receives the sequence h1
n in the ¯rst n ¡ 1 stages. De¯ne ¾2
+ for the ¯rst
n ¡ 1 stages as: play N2 in stage p · n ¡ 1 if ¹ s1
p = I1, and I2 otherwise.
De¯ne h2









N2 if ¹ s1
p = I1
I2 if ¹ s1
p = N1
¤ if ¹ s1
p = ¤
By construction of S, P¾1;¾2
+(h2
n) > 0 and P¾1;¾2
+(h1
njh2
n) = 1. Indeed, since
P¾1
¡;¾2(h1
n) > 0, all the stages for which ¹ s1
p = I1(and thus, all the stages for
which ¹ s2
p = N2) are stages in which ¾1 prescribes to play I1.
Given ¾2
+, we de¯ne two strategies ~ ¾2
+ and ¾2
+ which di®er only after h2
n.
² ~ ¾2
+ is de¯ned as:
1. follow ¾2





n, play N2 in stage n, select a ¯ctitious past ~ h2
n+1 according
to P¾[¢ j(h1
n;I1)] and continue with ¾2 as if the sequence of signals
received in the ¯rst n stages had been ~ h2
n+1.
² ¾2
+ is de¯ned as:




n, play I2 in stage n, select a ¯ctitious past ~ h2
n+1 according to
P¾[¢j(h1
n;¤)] and continue with ¾2, as if the sequence of signals received
in the ¯rst n stages had been ~ h2
n+1.


























































Thus, (2) follows from (3), which ends the proof of the induction step.
Finally, remark that P¾1
¡;¾2 (d1 = ¢jH1
N) = 1d1=¢; P¾1
¡;¾2-a.s., since d1 has
a H1
N-measurable version under P¾. (Recall that Á
1 is deterministic on supp
P¾. It is therefore enough to modify in an appropriate way the de¯nition
of d1 outside supp P¾ to get such a version.) Since P¾1
¡;¾2 ¿ P¾; any such
version is also a version under P¾1
¡;¾2. The result follows. |
4 In¯nitely many stages
4.1 Secure protocols generating minimal information
structures
We start with some preliminary results on secure protocols.
Proposition 1 Let (¾;Á) be a secure protocol generating the minimal infor-
mation structure ¹, and ¾1 = p¾1
0 + (1 ¡ p)¾1
1 with 0 < p · 1.





n) = P¾;Á(d =djH
1
n). (4)
13In this statement, ¾1 is interpreted as a mixed strategy, and ¾1 = p¾1
0 +
(1¡p)¾1
1 is an equality between probability distributions (elements of ¢(S1)).
The proposition holds for any general communication mechanism, as long as
players remember their past messages (perfect recall). Loosely speaking, it
asserts that, for any pure strategy in the support of ¾1, the induced distri-
bution on decisions is the same.
For simplicity of notations let P = P¾;Á and P 0 = P(¾1
0;¾2);Á, so that
P 0 ¿ P. We start with a few preliminary results. We then prove Proposition
1 at the end of the section.
Lemma 3 For hn 2 Hn, P 0(hnj H1
n) = P(hnj H1
n) P 0 almost surely.
Shortly, P 0(¢jH1
n) = P(¢jH1
n), P 0-a.s.: at stage n, the beliefs of player 1
on the actual play are the same under P and P 0.
Proof: This proof relies on perfect recall but does not require the secureness
of (¾;Á). Let hi
n = hi
n(hn) be the sequence of signals received by player i
along hn, and (mi
1;:::;mi
n¡1) the messages sent by player i along hi
n. It
















t is the truncation of hi
n at stage t. Note
that P(hn) = S(h1
n)S(h2
n). Denote by C(h1
n) the sequences in H2
n which are
consistent with h1



































Lemma 4 For d2 2 D2, P(d2 = d2jH1
1) = P 0(d2 = d2jH1
1) P 0 almost
surely.
Proof: let hm 2 Hm be ¯xed. For n ¸ m, hm may be viewed as a subset
of Hn (the subset of all histories in Hn that begin with hm). By applying








14The right side is a (P 0;(Hn)n) martingale converging to P 0(hmjH1
1) P 0-
a.s.. The left side is a (P;(Hn)n) martingale converging to P(hmjH1
1) P-
a.s.. Since P 0 ¿ P, it also converges to P(hmjH1
1), P 0-a.s.. Therefore,
P(hmjH1
1) = P 0(hmjH1
1) P 0-a.s..







0 -a.s. for any A 2 H1: (5)
Let X be a H1{measurable version of d2 under P (see the beginning of








1), P-a.s., hence also P
0-a.s.. (6)
Using (5), this completes the proof. |
Lemma 5 Under P 0, d1 is a su±cient statistic for d2 for player 1.
Proof: It is enough to prove that P 0(d2jH1
1) = P 0(d2jd1) P 0 a.s., for any














































The initial equality expresses Bayes's rule, the second equality is derived from
Lemma 4, and the third one uses that, by secureness, P(d2jh1
1) = P(d2jd1)
P-a.s., hence also P 0-a.s. since P 0 ¿ P.
Thus, P 0(d2jd1) = P(d2jd1), P 0-a.s.. The result follows by secureness
(R.2) and Lemma 4. |
Lemma 6 Under P 0, d1 is a minimal su±cient statistic for d2 for player 1.
Proof: Let d1;d
01 2 supp P 0, and assume that P 0(d2jd1) = P 0(d2jd
01) for all
d2 2 D2. Since P 0 ¿ P, d1;d
01 2 supp P. Now P(d2jd1) = P 0(d2jd1) (see the
15previous proof), and similarly P(d2jd
01) = P 0(d2jd1). Since d1 is a minimal
su±cient statistic for d2 for player 1 under P, d1 = d
01. |
Proof of Proposition 1:
For each d2 2 D2, consider the random variables ½(d2) = P(d2jd1) =
P(d2jH1
1), ½0(d2) = P 0(d2jd1) = P 0(d2jH1
1) and ½00(d2) = P(¾1
1;¾2);Á(d2jd1).
Set ½ = (½(d2))d22D2, ½0 = (½0(d2))d22D2 and ½00 = (½00(d2))d22D2: ½, ½0and
½00 are the standard experiments (see Blackwell [2]) characterizing the infor-
mation of h1
1 on d2 under P, P 0 and P(¾1
1;¾2);Á respectively. For any convex
function g on ¢(D2), h1









gd½00. On the other













gd½0 for every g, which implies that ½ and ½0 have the
same distribution under P and P 0. For d1 2 D1, de¯ne now r(d1) and r0(d1)







1)) = P(½ = r(d
1)) = P(d
1);
where the ¯rst and third equalities use minimality properties. Hence the
marginals of P and P 0 on D1 are equal. Since furthermore P(d2jd1) =
P 0(d2jd1), the marginals of P and P 0 on D = D1 £ D2 are also equal. This
proves the ¯rst claim.
To prove the second claim, ¯x n 2 N and h1
n 2 H1
n. Let ¿1
0 be the strategy
de¯ned as: play according to ¾1 until stage n, then follow ¾1
0 after histories
compatible with h1
n and ¾1 after other histories. Let ¿1
1 be the strategy de¯ned
similarly by replacing ¾1
0 by ¾1
1. It is easily seen that ¾1 = p¢¿1
0+(1¡p)¢¿1
1.
Hence by the ¯rst claim ¹(¿1





























n) > 0. This completes the
second claim. |
4.2 Proof for in¯nitely many stages
4.2.1 Organization of the proof
We ¯x a secure protocol (¾;Á) generating a minimal information structure.
Let d1 2 D1 be ¯xed throughout this section. For hn 2 Hn, ¾, Á and hn
16induce a probability P
hn





n is thus a function from fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 to [0;1] and for hn 2 suppP¾,
¼1
n = P¾;Á(d1jhn). We shall prove:
Proposition 2 For every n, ¼1
n is constant P¾;Á almost surely.
Before to proceed with the proof, we ¯rst show how to derive Theorem 1
from Proposition 2: The sequence (¼1
n)n is an (Hn)-martingale, that con-
verges P¾;Á-a.s. to P¾;Á [d1 = d1jH1
1]. By Remark 3, the limit coincides with
1d1=d1; P¾;Á-a.s. By Proposition 2, ¼1
n is a.s. constant, hence so is 1d1=d1.
Thus, either d1 = d1, P¾;Á-a.s., or d1 6= d1, P¾;Á-a.s. The support of ¹1 is
thus a singleton, and the same argument applies for ¹2.|
Let us describe the organization of the proof.
By Proposition 1, one has
P.1 E¿1;¾2 [¼1
n] = E¾1;¾2 [¼1
n], as soon as the mixed strategy ¾1 puts a posi-
tive probability on ¿1.
For any strategy f2 of player 2, consider the strategy ¿2 that coincides
with f2 up to stage n, and to ¾2 from stage n + 1. Then, P(¾1;¿2);Á(d1 =
d1) = E¾1;f2 [¼1
n]. From R.1, one deduces:
P.2 For each f2, E¾1;f2 [¼1
n] = E¾1;¾2 [¼1
n].
Let u2 = (u2
p)p be any fully mixed strategy of player 2 (i.e. the distribution
u2
p(h2
p) has full support, for each h2
p 2 H2
p). We prove in the next section that:
P.3 For P¾1;u2-almost every sequence hn 2 fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1, one has ¼1
n(hn) =
¼1
n(e hn), where e hn 2 fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 is the sequence obtained from hn by
replacing each occurrence of c in the sequence by an a.
We shall prove that any function pn : fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 ! [0;1] that satis¯es
P.1, P.2 and P.3 is P¾-a.s. constant. Observe that the three properties
involve only the de¯nition of ¾ = (¾1;¾2) in the ¯rst n ¡ 1 stages of com-
munication. Therefore we may focus on these stages. We call strategy up to
stage n the speci¯cation ¾i of a strategy for the ¯rst n¡1 stages of commu-




Observe that there are ¯nitely many pure strategies up to stage n.
17For a pair of strategies ¾ up to stage n, de¯ne the set of histories consistent
with ¾ for player 1 as: C1
¾ = fhn;P¾(h1
n(hn)) > 0g.
Given that P.1, P.2 and P.3 hold, Proposition 2 is a consequence of
Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 Let (¾1;¾2) be strategies up to stage n. Let pn be a function
fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 to [0;1]. Assume that A.1, A.2 and A.3 below hold:
A.1 For every f1 2 supp¾1,
Ef1;¾2 [pn] = E¾1;¾2 [pn]:
A.2 For every strategy f2 up to stage n,
E¾1;f2 [pn] = E¾1;¾2 [pn]:
A.3 For P¾1;u2-almost every sequence hn 2 fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1, one has pn(hn) =
pn(e hn), where e hn 2 fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 is the sequence obtained from hn by
replacing each occurrence of c in the sequence by an a.
Then pn is constant on C1
¾.
We prove in Section 4.2.2 that P.3 holds. Next, we prove Proposition 3
in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.2 Informative deviations: c's become a's
The title of this section is best understood with the statement of Lemma 7.
We sketch informally the argument used in this section. Assume that player
2, upon receiving the signal I2 in stage 1 (i.e., if the combination of messages
is c) continues as if he had received N2. In that case, the distribution of
d1 is what it would have been, had the combination of messages been a.




We extend the argument and show that if the signals to player 1 along
two sequences hn and ~ hn are the same, ¼1
n(hn) = ¼1
n(~ hn). This is the content
of Lemma 7 below.
We follow standard notations and write XcY 2 fa;b;c;¤gn to denote
the sequence obtained by concatenation of the sequence X, then c, then the
sequence Y (where X and Y may be empty).
18Recall that hi
n(hn) is the sequence of signals to player i along hn (it is the
value of the random variable hi
n on the set hn).
Let u2 be a completely mixed strategy of player 2. For every n and
X0aX1a¢¢¢aXk 2 fa;b;c;¤gn¡1,




Lemma 7 For any history XcY 2 fa;b;c;¤gn¡1 such that P¾1;u2(XcY ) > 0:
¼
1
n(XaY ) = ¼
1
n(XcY ) (8)
Proof: We prove the result by induction over the number of b's in XcY . The
proofs of the initial and induction steps are the same. Assume (8) holds for
sequences containing less than kb's and let XcY be a sequence with exactly
k b's. Write X = X0aX1 ¢¢¢aXl, and Y = Y0aY1 ¢¢¢aYm, where the Xp's
and Yq's contain no a's. For p 2 f0;:::;lg, q 2 f0;:::;mg, we let x2
p and y2
q





































We denote by h2
n the former, and by ~ h2
n the latter.
For any sequence hn = ~ X0c ~ X1 ¢¢¢c ~ Xlc~ Y0c~ Y1 ¢¢¢c~ Ym such that h2
n(hn) =
~ h2
n, we denote by r(hn) the sequence ~ X0a ~ X1 ¢¢¢a ~ Xla~ Y0a~ Y1 ¢¢¢a~ Ym.
Since the distribution of d1 must remain una®ected if player 2 plays after
~ h2

























n(r(hn))] = 0 (9)
19For any such sequence hn, either hn contains strictly less than k b's,
or hn = XcY . In the ¯rst case, ¼1
n(hn) = ¼1





n(XcY ) ¡ ¼
1
n(XaY )] = 0.
|
4.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof goes by induction over n. We shall drop the quali¯er \up to stage
n". For n = 1, there is nothing to prove. We assume that the result has been
established for n, and consider a pair of strategies (up to stage n+1) (¾1;¾2)
and pn+1 that satisfy the assumptions of the proposition.
Given si 2 fIi;Ni;¤g, we denote by ¾i(¢jsi) the continuation strategy of







For si 2 fIi;Ni;¤g, we also denote by ¾3¡i(¢jsi) the belief held by player




1 = Ni) £ ¾i(¢jNi) + P¾(mi
1 = Ni) £ ¾i(¢jIi)
The notation ¾i(¢j¤) is not ambiguous since ¾i(¢js1 = ¤) = ¾i(¢js2 = ¤).
We prove that pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾ \fs1
1 = ¤g, over C1
¾ \fs1
1 =
N1g, and over C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = I1g in Steps 1, 2, and 3 respectively. We then
conclude by showing that those constants are equal in Step 4.
Step 0:
Observe that pn+1(chn) = pn+1(ahn) whenever chn 2 suppP¾1;u2.
Step 1: pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = ¤g
De¯ne pn(¢j¤) : fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 ! [0;1] by pn(hnj¤) = pn+1(¤hn).
Lemma 8 If, P¾(s1 = (¤;¤)) > 0. then ¾1(¢j¤), ¾2(¢j¤) and pn(¢j¤) satisfy
A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Proof: We start with A.3. Let XcY 2 suppP¾1(¢j¤);u2 be a sequence of length
n¡1. Then pn(XcY j¤) = pn+1(¤XcY ) = pn+1(¤XaY ) since P¾1;u2(¤XcY ) >
0. Therefore, pn(XcY j¤) = pn(XaY j¤).
20We turn to A.2. Let f2, ¹ f2, and e f2, be strategies up to stage n. De¯ne
strategies ¿2 and ¹ ¿2 up to stage n + 1 by:
² play I2 in stage 1;
² switch to f2 (resp. ¹ f2) if s2
1 = ¤; to e f2 otherwise.
More explicitly ¿2(¤¢) = f2(¢), ¿2(I2¢) = e f2(¢) and a similar de¯nition
holds for ¹ ¿2. Applying A.2 to ¿2 and to ¹ ¿2 yields:
E¾1;¿2 [pn+1] = E¾1;¹ ¿2 [pn+1].
This implies, since ¿2 and ¹ ¿2 coincide after I1,
E¾1(¢j¤);f2 [pn(¢j¤)] = E¾1(¢j¤); ¹ f2 [pn(¢j¤)].
A symmetric proof shows that A.1 holds (except that f1; e f1 should be taken
in supp¾2(¢j¤)).|
Corollary 1 pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = ¤g.
Proof: If P¾(s1 = (¤;¤)) = 0 there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, the
induction hypothesis applied to ¾1(:j¤), ¾2(:j¤), and pn(:j¤) shows that pn+1
is constant over f¤hn, hn 2 C1
¾1(:j¤);¾2(:j¤)g. But then, C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = ¤g = f¤hn,
hn 2 C1
¾1(:j¤);¾2(:j¤)g.|
Let p¤ be this value.
Step 2: pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = N1g
De¯ne pn(¢jN1) : fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 ! [0;1] as
pn(hnjN1) = P¾(m2
1 = N2) £ pn+1(ahn) + P¾(m2
1 = I2) £ pn+1(chn)
= pn+1(chn) by Step 0.
Lemma 9 If P¾(s1
1 = N1) > 0, then ¾1(¢jN1);¾2(¢jN1) and pn(¢jN1) satisfy
A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Proof: The proof of A.3 follows from the one in Lemma 8. We now prove
A.2. Given strategies f2, ¹ f2 and e f2 up to stage n, de¯ne ¿2 and ¹ ¿2 as:
² play I2 in stage 1;
21² switch to f2(resp. ¹ f2) if s2
1 = I2; switch to e f2 otherwise.
A.2 applied to ¿2 and ¹ ¿2 yields
E¾1;¿2 [pn+1] = E¾1;¹ ¿2 [pn+1],
and hence
E¾1(¢jN1);f2 [pn+1(c;¢)] = E¾1(¢jN1); ¹ f2 [pn+1(c;¢)]. (10)
From Step 0,
E¾1(¢jN1);f2 [pn+1(a;¢)] = E¾1(¢jN1); ¹ f2 [pn+1(a;¢)]: (11)












It remains to prove A.1. Given f1 2 supp ¾1(¢jN1), de¯ne ¿1 by :
² play N1 in stage 1;
² switch to f1 from stage 2 on.
Since ¿1 belong to supp ¾1, one has
E¿1;¾2 [pn+1] = E¾1;¾2 [pn+1] (12)























Hence Ef1;¾2(¢jN1) [pn(¢jN1)] does not depend on f1 2 supp ¾1(¢jN1).|
Corollary 2 pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = N1g.
Proof: The case P¾(s1 = N1) = 0 is trivial. Otherwise, applying the
induction hypothesis to ¾1(¢jN1);¾2(¢jN1) and pn(¢jN1) shows that pn+1 is
constant on fchn;hn 2 C1
¾1(¢jN1);¾2(¢jN1)g. By Step 0 it also takes the same
value on fahn;hn 2 C1
¾1(¢jN1);¾2(¢jN1)g. Finally, C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = N1g = fahn;hn 2
C1
¾1(¢jN1);¾2(¢jN1)g [ fchn;hn 2 C1
¾1(¢jN1);¾2(¢jN1)g.|
Call pa this value.
22Step 3: pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = I1g
De¯ne pn(¢jI2) : fa;b;c;¤g
n¡1 ! [0;1] by
pn(hnjI
2) = pn+1(bhn).
Lemma 10 If P¾(s1 = (I1;N2)) > 0, then ¾1(¢jI1), ¾2(¢jN2) and pn(¢jI2)
satisfy A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Proof: The proof of A.3 is a straightforward adaptation of the one in
Lemma 8. We now prove A.1. Given f1; ¹ f1 2 supp ¾1(¢jI1) and e f1 2 supp
¾1(¢j¤), de¯ne ¿1 and ¹ ¿1 as:
² play I1 in stage 1;
² switch to f1(resp. ¹ f1) if s1
1 = I1; switch to e f1 otherwise.
Then,
E¿1;¾2 [pn+1] = E¹ ¿1;¾2 [pn+1]
implies
Ef1;¾2(¢jN2) [pn+1(b¢)] = E ¹ f1;¾2(¢jN2) [pn+1(b¢)]. (13)
which is A.1.
We ¯nally prove A.2. Given a strategy f2 up to stage n, de¯ne ¿2 by :
² play N2 in stage 1;
² switch to f2 from stage 2 on.
By A.2, one has
E¾1;¿2 [pn+1] = E¾1;¾2 [pn+1]. (14)








By Step 2, this is also equal to








Hence, E¾1(¢jI1);f2 [pn+1(b¢)] does not depend on f2; A.2 follows.|
Corollary 3 pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = I1g
Proof: Assume P¾(s1 = (I1;N2)) > 0, apply the induction hypothesis and
remark that C1
¾ \ fs1
1 = N1g = fbhn;hn 2 C1
¾1(¢jI1);¾2(¢jN2)g.|
We denote by pb this value.
23Step 4: pn+1(hn+1) is constant over C1
¾




1 = N1g and pn+1 is constant and equal to pa.
Now assume that ¾1sends I1 with positive probability in the ¯rst stage.
Let ¿2 and ¹ ¿2 be the strategies that send respectively N2 and I2 in the ¯rst
stage, and coincide with ¾2 afterwards. One has



















Since E¾1;¿2 [pn+1] = E¾1;¹ ¿2 [pn+1], one gets pb = p¤.






1 = ¤g so that pn+1 is constant and equal to p¤ on this set.
Finally, in the case where ¾1 sends both messages N1 and I1 with positive
probability in the ¯rst stage. Let ¿1 and ¹ ¿1 be the strategies that send
respectively N1 and I1 in the ¯rst stage, and coincide with ¾1 afterwards.
One has
E¿1;¾2 [pn+1] = p
a
and
E¹ ¿1;¾2 [pn+1] = p
¤:
Since E¿1;¾2 [pn+1] = E¹ ¿1;¾2 [pn+1], one gets pa = p¤.|
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